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Abstract
This article studies the behavior of the …rm when it is searching to
…ll a vacancy. The principal hypothesis is that the …rm can o¤er two
kinds of contracts to the workers, short-term or long-term contracts.
The short-term contract is like a probationary stage in which the …rm
can learn the worker’s type. After this stage the …rm can propose
a long-term contract to the worker, or it can decide to …nd another
worker. We suppose that the …rm and the worker bargain over the
wage of both types of contract, and that the worker’s bargaining
power is di¤erent according to the type of contract. We utilize this
framework to study the …rms’ optimal policy choice and its welfare
implications.
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We study the behavior of a …rm searching to …ll a vacancy. The principal
assumption is that they o¤er two kinds of contracts to the workers: a short-
term contract (STC)1 or a long-term one (LTC). The short-term contract is
as a probationary stage in which the …rm can learn the worker’s type. Then,
the …rm proposes a long-term contract to the worker, or it decides to look
for another worker. We suppose that the …rm and the worker bargain over
the wage of both types of contract, and that the worker’s bargaining power
is di¤erent according to thew type of contract. We use such a framework in
order to study the …rms’ optimal contractual choice and its welfare impact.
The share of temporary work in total employment has been increasing in
Europe in recent years. At the end of the seventies, labor market regulations
restricted temporary jobs to speci…c tasks, characterized by large variations
in productivity. Those regulations have changed somewhat since the eighties,
and it is now possible in a number of European countries to hire workers on
a temporary basis even for jobs which are not subject to such variations in
productivity.
While in 1983 only 4% of the employees in the EC held temporary jobs,
in 1991 this …gure had rose to 10%.2
Temporary contracts are often regarded as a measure of labor market
‡exibility. They o¤er a means of ensuring that the returns to entrepreneurs
and the start-up and demise of …rms are unconstrained by institutional rigidi-
ties such as employment restriction legislation and trade union activity. In
periods of rapid technical change or demand volatility, temporary contracts
allow …rms to hire workers as they wish.
Conversely, the STC could be also viewed as a screening devise, that al-
lows employers to observe the productivity of the job-worker pair. In this
perspective, job matches are interpreted as ”experience good”, in the tradi-
tion of Jovanovic (1979, 1984). In that case they may seek to select the right
workers into probationary jobs.
Using micro data drawn from the Spanish Labour Force Survey , Güell
and Petrongolo (2000) observe an important spike at duration around 1 year
in the study of the duration pattern of …xed-term contract. That observation
supports the idea that the …xed-term contract is used as a screening device.
That is, successful workers obtain permanent renewals much before the legal
limit of their contracts (3 years). At the same time, they observe another
1The short-term contract (STC) and temporary contract will be used interchangeably
throughout the paper.
2See OECD (1999) for a detailed description of …xed-term contract regulation in Eu-
rope.
1spike in the hazard at 3 years. This suggests that …xed-term contracts provide
to some …rms a cheaper option for adjusting their employment level.
Moreover, using a panel of Spanish …rms, Bentolila and Dolado (1994) and
Bentolila and Saint-Paul (1992) show that the introduction of …xed-duration
contracts is equivalent to a reduction in …ring cost and that its impact on
unemployment is ambiguous.
Booth, Francesconi, and Frank (2000), using data from the British House-
hold Panel Survey, …nd that temporary workers report lower level of job satis-
faction, receive less training, and are less well-paid than their counterparts in
permanent employment. Conversely, they …nd that experience on …xed-term
contracts may lead to high wage growth if the workers move to permanent
full-time jobs. This is because workers who had such contracts enjoy high
returns to ”experience capital” once they acquire a permanent job.
Wasmer (1999), Cahuc and Postel-Vinay (1999), in a theoretical model,
have introduced temporary job in matching models following the traditional
equilibrium models of the labor market, begun with the work of Diamond
(1982), Mortensen (1982), and Pissarides (1990).
Wasmer (1999), in a model with exogenous job destruction, shows that
in the periods of low growth the …rms are more willing to make use of STCs,
which is favorable to employment. Cahuc and Postel-Vinay (1999), in a
model with endogenous job destruction, show that the combination of tem-
porary jobs and …ring restriction may be both ine¢cient in terms of aggregate
welfare and an inadequate weapon to …ght unemployment. This result comes
from the fact that the share of temporary jobs transformed into permanent
jobs is decreasing in the level of the …ring cost.
This may explain the dramatic growth in temporary jobs in France, Italy
and Spain, countries characterized by high levels of employment protection.
In contrast, in the United States and Britain, which have relatively little
employment protection regulation, the proportion of the workforce on …xed
term contracts has been fairly stable.
This increase has had many consequences for di¤erent aspects of labor
market. Notably, it has a¤ected the bargaining position of workers, nega-
tively for employees with short-term contracts, and possibly positively for
the employees with long-term contracts (see Bentolila and Dolado, 1994).
In this paper we see the STC like a screening device. That is, we suppose
that the only way to determine the quality of a particular match is ”to form
the match and experience it”3. In that case, …rms may seek to select the
right workers into the STC.
We suppose that the …rm and the worker engage in a bargaining both for
3Jovanovic (1979).
2the short and for the long-term wages. Moreover, we suppose that the worker
bargaining power is di¤erent according to the type of contract considered.
To simplify the analysis of the policy choice of the …rms, we assume that
the worker and the …rm split the production according to their bargaining
power. Search cost is captured by the discount factor. In order to preserve
the stationarity of the distribution of types on the search market, we assume
that the workers who …lled a long-term work are replaced by workers of same
quality. We utilize this framework to study the …rms’ optimal policy.
An alternative formulation of the model would suppose that there is an
exogenous incoming ‡ow of workers. This formulation will be explored on
the extension of this paper, to study the steady state of the dynamic system
and how the optimal contract choice of the …rms could be a¤ected.
Our model is related to the works of Acemoglu (1997), and Marimon and
Zilibotti (1999). The former constructs a model where the …rms open jobs of
two di¤erent ”qualities”. He studies how the size of unemployment bene…ts
and minimum wages a¤ects the equilibrium composition of good vs. bad
jobs.
The latter also study the impact of unemployment bene…ts on the econ-
omy in a model with heterogenous agents. The authors suppose that both
…rms and workers are uniformly distributed along a circle and the productiv-
ity of a worker depends on the location of the …rm, and decreases with the
distance between the worker and the …rm.
Like this last work, we construct a model with heterogeneous agents, but
distributed on [0;1]. However, as in Acemoglu (1997), we analyze the simple
one-sided search case.
In this paper, we argue that …rms may see temporary contracts as a
measure to hire workers like they wish. This policy may not depend from
demand volatility4 but from the possibility to hire workers in a cheaper way,
that comes from the lower level of short-term wages. Moreover, we show that
…rms may also use STCs like a screening device. The choice of the policy
to follow depends crucially on the workers’ relative bargaining power. If the
relative power is su¢ciently divergent …rms prefer to engage workers directly
with a long-term contract or short-term one, depending on the sign of this
value. If, on the contrary, this value is not so much divergent, …rms will
discover the worker’s type through the short-term contract and engage her
only if her ability is above a threshold, endogenously determined.
We also envisage a Social Planner whose objective is to maximize the
sum of workers’ utilities and …rms’ pro…ts by intervening in the labor market
4See, for example, Wasmer (1999), who study STCs as a measure of labor market
‡exibility.
3by imposing transfers from the …rms to the unemployed workers and/or by
regulating the relative bargaining power.
The model is introduced in Section 2. Sections 3 and 4 present the main
results. Section 5 analyzes the welfare and Section 6 an extension. Section 7
concludes.
2T h e M o d e l
Workers are characterized by a real-value (the worker’s type) distributed
on [0;1]. The worker’s type is denoted x and is distributed according to
atomless, continuous distribution function F(x) with full support on [0;1].
We denote its density by f(x). The economy has a labor force of mass 1.
Firms are homogenous and the total measure of …rms is M>1.A te a c h
moment of time a …rm can have either a …lled position, or a open vacancy,
or be idle. An active …rm with a …lled position employs one worker, and
obtains a revenue from selling the output it produces. Idle …rms pay no
c o s ta n de a r nn or e v e n u e . W ea s s u m eM to be su¢ciently large so that a
positive measure of …rms remain idle in any of the equilibria analyzed here.
The renters do not work, and each of them holds a balanced portfolio of
shares of all M …rms. The income of renter consists of dividends (possibly
negative, in which case he is liable for the losses) plus an endowment ‡ow.
This endowment is assumed to be su¢ciently large to avoid limited liability
issues5.
The production function in each …rm is the following:
Y = yx (1)
where x i st h et y p eo ft h ew o r k e ra n dy the technology of the homogenous
…rms. Throughout the article, we normalize the …rm’s technology to 1.
Time is discrete and runs as t =0 ;1;::: + 1.A t a n y d a t e t,… r m sc a n
create a position at cost k that represents the …rm job advertising. They are
matched to the workers according to a simple random matching technology.
Arrival follows a Poisson process, where ® i st h ea r r i v a lr a t eo fa… r mf a c e db y
aw o r k e r .A s® is assumed to be independent of the number of participants
in the search market, the matching function exhibits constant returns.
At each meeting in the search market the …rms is not able observe the
type of the worker. We allow the …rm to o¤er a probationary contract to the
worker. During this period the …rm can learn the worker’s type, and it can
decide whether to o¤er a long-term contract after the short-term one.
5See Marimon and Zilibotti (1999).
4We assume that if a long-term contract is signed, there is an incoming
‡ow of workers of the same quality so that the workers’ distribution is time-
invariant.6
Firms have a discount factor denoted ±>0, and they obtain zero pro…t
if there is no matching. The discount factor captures the search cost.
We now de…ne optimal behavior for the representative …rm. A policy for
a …rm is the choice of the contract to o¤er to the worker. The …rms can
decide to engage workers with short-term or long-term contracts. We will
make the hypothesis that there are no …ring costs on the market.
The …rm has three possibilities as to the policy it may pursue. Either
it only o¤ers short term contracts (S); or it only o¤ers long term contracts
(L); or it may o¤er a short term contract to begin with, switching to a long
term one after its completion (SL). The advantage of this last type of policy
is that the …rm, when o¤ering the long term contract, has full information
about the worker’s type.
The …rm seeks to maximize pro…t by choosing the optimal combination
of contracts. So, a policy for a …rm y is a !f L;S;SL(¾x)g where ¾x is
measurable subset of [0;1] corresponding to the set of workers the …rm will
accept after knowing the worker’s type.
In order to study the optimal policy choice we have to analyze before
the …rm’s optimal strategy in the SL policy, where a strategy is represented
by ¾x corresponding to set of workers the …rm accepts after the short-term
contract.
2.1 Bellman equations
Consider the Bellman equations characterizing the …rm.
Let X denote the set of workers accepted by the …rm. Then
Max E¦


















6On the extension of the paper (section 6), we suppose that there is an exogenous





xf(x)dx ¡ wo) (3)
In the …rst case, a = SL,w h e ni tc h o o s e st ob e g i nw i t haS T C ,t h e
long-term wage, from starting on period 1, will be contingent on the worker’s
type, wa = wsl(x). The domain X is in this case equal to ¾x.
If the …rm decides to o¤er exclusively STCs (a = S), X is the empty set.
If the …rm decides to o¤er directly a LTC (a = L); it can not distinguish
the worker’s type, and hence the relevant X is the full support [0;1] and
wo = wl.
The wages wsl(x), wl and wo are negotiated between the …rm and the
worker.
2.2 Wage Bargaining
To simplify the analysis of the policy choice of the …rm, we assume that
the worker and the …rm split the production according to their bargaining
power. Moreover, we assume that the worker’s bargaining power is di¤erent
from one type of contract to the other.
The wages on the long-term informed contract (that is, after a trial stage)
will be contingent to the worker’s type:
wsl = °xi (4)
where ° is an index of the worker’s bargaining power.
On the contrary, the wages on the short-term and the long-term contract
(without trial stage) will be in expected value, because the …rm doesn’t know









where ´ denotes the bargaining power of the worker on STCs.
To simplify the analysis of the results, we de…ne workers’ relative bargain-
ing power (RBP), the di¤erence between the long-term bargaining power and
the short-term one, i.e. RBP = ° ¡ ´.
63 Search equilibrium on the SL policy
The optimal strategy in the SL policy is ¾x corresponding to the set of
workers accepted by …rm after the STC.
Hence, for the stationary strategy pro…le (¾x), we de…ne the expected
payo¤ of a …rm y as E¦SL(¾x).
De…nition 1 A search equilibrium in the policy SL is a stationary strategy





















Proof. See Appendix 1.
Proposition 1 characterizes the search equilibrium of the SL policy. In
this equilibrium, the …rms partition the workers into two subintervals. Through
the STCs, the …rms can learn the workers’ types, that they will engage in a
LTC only if the worker’s ability is above the threshold z. This value depends
on relative bargaining powers (RBP).
To better understand this result, it is instructive to consider a simple
example, where the abilities are uniformly distributed on [0;1][F(x)=x].
Figure 1 depicts how the threshold z varies with the market power °,t a k i n g
° = ´, k =0 :3,a n d± =0 :8.
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Figure 1: search equilibrium on the SL policy, with the ° = ´
7From …gure 1, we see that when the workers bargaining power is very
high, the representative …rm proposes to every worker a long-term contract
after the short one. In the example this is will always be satis…ed if ° ¸ 0:83.
The following proposition summarizes some comparative statics proper-
ties of the equilibrium.
Lemma 2 As the discount parameter ± increases, the threshold z increases.
Similarly, as the matching becomes more e¢cient. On the contrary, as the
bargaining market power of the worker on the short-term contracts increases,
or the advertising cost k increases, z decreases. An increase of the workers’




Proof. See Appendix 1.2
Lemma 2 establishes that as frictions on the search market are reduced
(either through an increase in the e¢ciency of the matching technology or
in the discount factor), the more quali…ed workers become more choosy, and
only a smaller subset of workers will be engaged. The e¤ect of an increase of
workers bargaining power on the short-term contract (or in k) has an opposite
e¤ect: a bigger proportion of workers will be o¤ered long term contracts. An
increase in the workers bargaining power on the long-term contracts will
i n v o l v ea ni n c r e a s ei nz if and only if the expected output of the workers on
the temporary market is bigger than the cost to re-open the vacancy.
4 Optimal contract
After the characterization of the SL contract, we can study the optimal
contract choice of the …rm. We will start the analysis with the hypothesis
that ° = ´; we relax this hypothesis later on.
Lemma 3 If ° = ´,t h eS policy is never an equilibrium.
The intuition of this result is very simple. If the two bargaining powers
a r et h es a m eo nt h et w om a r k e t s ,t h ee x p e c t e dp r o … tf r o mo ¤ e r i n go n l y
short-term contracts (S) to the workers is the same as the one from o¤ering
directly a long-term contract (L) to the …rst worker that is matched. The
only di¤erence is that, in the S case, the …rm will have a supplementary cost
that comes from the fact the it has to re-open the vacancy each period.
Proposition 4 If ° = ´, SL policy is an equilibrium if ´ · ´¤,o t h e r w i s e
we have an equilibrium L.
8Proof. Policy S is an equilibrium if E¦S ¸ E¦L;E¦SL.I fw e l o o k a t
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¸ 0
this condition is never true. Moreover, policy SL is an equilibrium if E¦SL >
E¦L, we …nd:































If ° = ´,t h eS policy is never an equilibrium. The intuition of this result
is very simple. If the two bargaining powers are the same on the two markets,
the expected pro…t from o¤ering only short-term contracts (S)t ot h ew o r k e r s
is the same as the one from o¤ering directly a long-term contract (L)t ot h e
…rst worker that is matched. The only di¤erence is that, in the S case, the
…rm will have a supplementary cost that comes from the fact the it has to
re-open the vacancy each period.
To better understand the result of the proposition 4, we take the same
example as before. Figure 2 depicts the behavior of the …rm on the contract
choice.




Figure 2: …rms’ optimal policy, with ° = ´
When the …rm has an important bargaining power, it prefers to be selec-
tive, screening the worker on the short-term contract and taking only the best
quali…ed. In that case, the costs to re-open a position will be compensated
with the surplus it can get in the following period.
As this power is lesser the surplus that it can get by waiting to …nd the
good worker will be smaller, and therefore the cost to re-open the position
each period will be di¢cultly compensated.
If we relax the hypothesis that the di¤erence in workers bargaining powers
is zero, we …nd that the …rm could prefer to engage workers exclusively with
short-term contracts.
9Proposition 5 Policy SL is an equilibrium if ´¤
2 · ´ · ´¤
1,p o l i c yL if
´>´ ¤
1;´¤
3,a n dp o l i c yS if ´<´ ¤
2;´ ¤
3.
Proof. See Appendix 2.1
Taking the same example as before, with ° =0 :8, we have the following
…gure.





Figure 3: …rms’ optimal policy, with ° 6= ´
From …gure 3, if the RBP is negative and su¢ciently high, the …rm will
prefer to engage the workers directly with a LTC. If these powers have the
same value or become su¢ciently divergent in the opposite sign, it will prefer
to turn to a SL policy, in which it can screen the worker quality in the STC
and eventually engage her with a LTC afterwards. Finally, if the RBP is
positive and high , the …rm will always prefer to engage in each period workers
with temporary contracts.
Lemma 6 As ° increases, the values of ´¤
2 and ´¤
3 increase, and ´¤
1 increases







Proof. See Appendix 2.2
From the above Lemma, we conclude easily that if the workers’ bargaining







xf(x)dx, it is more likely to o¤er L policy and
nothing can be said about the SL one. On the contrary, if this condition is
not satis…ed, we are more likely to get a SL policy in equilibrium, and the
impact on the likelihood of the L policy is indeterminate.
5W e l f a r e
To analyze the social e¢cient policy, we look before at the workers’ welfare,
de…ned as the sum of workers’ utility in each possible policy7.A f t e r w a r d s ,
we will look at the total welfare de…ned as the sum of workers’ welfare and
…rms’ expected pro…ts in each possible policy a.
7The workers’ utilities are de…ned in Appendix 3.




x<z +( 1¡ F(z))EU
a
x¸z (7)
where a = sl;s;l.
It is straightforward to compute the policy that maximizes the workers’
welfare.
Proposition 7 If ° = ´, the workers’ welfare is maximum with a = L.
Proof. See Appendix 3.1
If the workers’ bargaining powers are the same, the highest attainable
workers’ welfare is obtained with a = L.
If ° = ´, a STC is never optimal for the workers. This is because after a
STC they have to return to the labor market and look for another employ-
ment opportunity, which they will …nd with a probability ®. The uncertainty
of …nding a new job could only be compensated by a bigger short-term market
power.
A di¤erent kind of contract may maximize workers’ welfare only if the
market powers are su¢ciently divergent.
Proposition 8 The workers’ welfare is maximum with policy SL if ´¤¤
1 ·
´ · ´¤¤
2 , with policy L if ´<´ ¤¤
1 ;´¤¤
3 ,a n dp o l i c yS if ´>´ ¤¤
2 ;´¤¤
3 .
Proof. See Appendix 3.2
If we carry out the same numerical example as in section 4, we obtain
again the result given in proposition 7. On the contrary, for ° =0 :5, we …nd
that the workers’ welfare is at a maximum with the policy S for ´>0:6,a n d
again a = L otherwise.




Proof. See Appendix 3.3
If the workers’ bargaining power on the LTCs decreases, the interval of
values of ´ where the workers’ welfare will be at a maximum with the L policy
is smaller. The opposite happens for the S policy, while it is indeterminate
for the SL policy.
In this example, the policy a = SL will never maximize the workers’
welfare. In fact, if ´ is small, the policy L will be clearly preferred to the
policy SL. The higher this bargaining power, the more policy SL becomes
interesting from a workers’ welfare point of view. In this last case the increase
in the aggregate workers’ utility is driven mainly by the utility of the workers
11with type i<z , while instead the increase in aggregate workers’ utility when
policy S is implemented is due to an increase of wealth of all types of workers.
This e¤ect will push the welfare up to a lesser extent in the case SL that in
the S one. This explains the superiority of the latter policy for high values of
the short-term bargaining power. It also explains why policy SL will never
maximize the workers’ welfare for each value of the parameter ´.
To complete the analysis, we should look at whether the workers’ welfare
maximizing policy is also the one that is optimal for …rms. However, the
analytical expressions become cumbersome when we add both utilities and
pro…ts. We therefore brie‡y illustrate this point with the help of a few
numerical simulations.





Making the same numerical example as before, we …nd that a policy S
is never optimal from the total welfare point of view, for every value of °
and ´. This result comes from the fact that this policy could be e¢cient for
…rms only when the bargaining power on the short-term wages is very low.
In that case, the expected pro…t for the …rms is very high but this gain is
counterbalanced by the workers that bear a double cost, coming both from
the low wages and the search cost in each period8.
Total welfare attains a maximum with policy SL,o n l yi f° and ´ are suf-
…ciently low. If ° is high, the …rms’ gains from screening do not compensate
the workers’ lost due to short-term contracts. On the contrary, if ´ is high,
the gain from the screening activity of the …rms will be partially canceled by
the high wages they have to pay to workers.
In all other cases policy L maximizes total welfare.
We now check whether there are labor market interventions that are wel-
fare improving. In particular, we allow the Social Planner to design a transfer
policy from the …rms to the workers and to regulate bargaining power.
The …rms prefer to engage workers exclusively with short-term contracts
(policy S) only in particular cases when the BP is positive and high. In that
case, the Social Planner has to pay more attention to the bargaining of the
short-term wage, to incentive the …rms to move from this policy to a di¤erent
one9.
If the …rms adopt policy L, then their interests coincide with the workers’
ones, and this does not leave room for intervention.
8If, on the contrary, we would have high shor-term bargaining power, then the reverse
happens: …rms loose and workers gain with policy S.
9This policy could take the form of a minum wage on the short contracts.
12On the contrary, if …rms prefer to screen among workers (policy SL)t h e
Social Planner must begin by checking whether this is harmful for workers.
If this is the case, a tax on …rms’ surplus might be envisaged, corresponding
to the di¤erence between E¦SL and E¦L if ´<´ ¤
3,o rE¦SL and E¦S
otherwise10.
This tax could be used to redistribute the …rms’ bene…ts stemming from
the screening policy, without eroding the …rms’ interest in pursuing it.
A welfare improving way to use this …scal receipt would be to redistribute
it directly to the disfavored workers engaged with short-term contracts and
not retained for a long-term one. Or, equivalently, to let each …rm pay a
lump-sum amount to every worker it let go after the probationary contract.















,o t h e r w i s e
11.
where [1 ¡ F(z)] is the probability that the …rm matches a worker with a
type more than z12. To put things clear, we illustrate with an example. Say
this probability [1 ¡ F(z)] is 0.25. Then the expected waiting time for the
…rm to …ll a vacancy is four periods. Hence, in each of the four periods in
which the …rm does not hire the worker it gives this worker one fourth of its
excess pro…t. When it will …nally …nd the matching worker, it will already
have given away all the di¤erence between the pro…t it does out of the SL
policy and the one it would make in the …rst best of the economy.
This policy could be coupled or replaced by a policy of bargaining reg-
ulation , to incite the …rms to make use of a policy L, or to compensate,
through a higher short-term wage, the workers with an unstable situation.
6E x t e n s i o n
In this section, we relax the hypothesis that if a long-term contract is signed,
there is an incoming ‡ow of workers of the same quality so that the workers’
distribution is time-invariant. If this is the case, the composition of the labor
force searching for a position will evolve in time according to …rms’ policies.
10Look at the equations (19), (20), and (18).
12The …rms engages in long-term contract only workers with an aility above the treshold
z. See Section 3.
13We assume that the incoming ‡ow of workers in the search market at each
period, that we denote ¸, equals the out‡ow. Among the set of new entrants
at any time, let G(x) denote the probability that any new worker has a type
not greater than x and g(x) its density.
Let H(x;t) and h(x;t) be respectively the distribution function and the
density of the worker type x i nt h es e a r c hm a r k e ta tt i m et.M o r e o v e r ,t h e
workers are assumed to have a probability ¯ to die at any interval of time.
The analysis of the composition of the labor force is not interesting in the
case of the policy a = SL and a = L, because the …rms will o¤er the same
kind of contract to each type of workers. It is simple to demonstrate that
the steady state value of the density of the worker, will equal the density of
the new entrants, i.e. h(x)=g(x),w h e r eh(x) is the steady state value of
h(x;t).
The problem becomes relevant if we analyze the search equilibrium on
the SL policy. Given (h(x);H (x)), from Proposition 1, it follows that the
…rms, in the SL policy, partition the workers in to two classes, and engage
only those with a type x ¸ z. This partition implies a unique distribution of
type among those who ‡ow out: [z;1].W h a ti ti si n t e r e s t i n gi st h ei m p a c t
of the introduction of the dynamics on the threshold z,t h a tw ed e n o t ez0,t o
avoid confusion with previous sections.
De…nition 2 A search equilibrium in the policy SL is de…ned as a se-
quence fh(x;t);H(x;t)g and …rms’ strategy (¾x) such that: (i) given
fh(x;t);H(x;t)g,s t r a t e g y¾x is optimal for the …rms; (ii) sequence
fh(x;t);H(x;t)g is consistently generated by strategy ¾x. fh(x;t);H(x;t)g
is a steady state equilibrium if is a stationary sequence.
Now consider the evolution of the density h(x;t). The probability in each
period that a worker matches a …rm is ®. In that case, all workers obtain a
short-term contract for the …rst period. Moreover, those with type x ¸ z0
obtain a long-term contract in the following periods with probability 1; and
those with type x<zwith probability 0.
T h e‡ o w - i no fn e ww o r k e r si ne a c hp e r i o di s¸, the ‡ow-in of type x being
¸g(x). Hence balanced ‡ow is satis…ed if and only if
ht+1(i)=ht(i)(1 ¡ ® ¡ ¯)+¸g(i) (9)
where i>z ,
ht+1(j)=ht(j)(1 ¡ ¯)+¸g(j) (10)
where j · z, knowing that ¯ denotes the probability to die in an interval of
time.
14¸ is expected to evolve according to
¸ =[ ®(1 ¡ Ht(z
0)) + ¯] (11)
























The Search Equilibrium13 of the policy a = SL implies a partition of the
workers into classes, while balanced ‡ows implies that h(i) and h(j) must































Proposition 10 now gives conditions that fully characterize a SSE.
13See Proposition 1.
15Proposition 10 Given (g;G),t h e n(f;F;¸) de…nes a SSE if and only if
f satis…es (13), (14), and ¸ (11), where z satis…ed the partition de…ned by
(15).
Proof. By construction, any SSE must satisfy the conditions described
by Proposition 10. Any solution to Proposition 10 implies that H(:) has
the required properties of a steady state distribution function, i.e. H is
increasing over interval [0;1] with H(0) = 0 and H(1) = 1. It also follows







h(i)dx =1 . Hence such a solution identi…es a SSE as it satis…es the
Search Equilibrium and balanced ‡ow.
If we relax the hypothesis of distribution invariance, we …nd that …rm’s
optimal strategy in the SL policy, where a strategy is represented by ¾x
corresponding to set of workers the …rm accepts after the short-term contract,
will change according the densities h(i) and h(j).
Note that, as z, z0 depends positively on ® (the rate at which a …rm
matches a worker). On the contrary, z0 depends negatively on the sum of
®G(:) ( t h er a t ea tw h i c h… r m sm a t c haw o r k e rw i t hat y p el e s st h a nz0), and
¯ (the probability for a worker to die in an interval of time).
It is easy to see that, if we suppose f(x)=g(x),t h et h r e s h o l dz0 is smaller
than z. This result comes from the composition of the labor force searching
for a position which evolves in time according to the …rms’ policy to engage
only workers with type more than z0. This implies that in steady state the
distribution of types searching for job will feature an asymmetry toward low
types. This pushes the …rms to accept workers of lower types.
From the optimal contract point of view, the results are not substantially
a¤ected. The expected utilities of the policies a = L;S,w i l lr e m a i nu n -
changed. On the contrary, the expected utility of the policy a = SL, will be
lower for the di¤erent distribution of types. So, …rms prefer to make more
use of L and S policies. If we consider …gure 3, the interval of values of ´ on
which SL is the optimal policy decreases.
7 Conclusions
In this paper, we have supposed that the only way to determine the quality
of a particular match is ”to form the match and experience it”. That is, …rms
view the initial STC as a probationary stage where they may seek to select
the right workers.
16In this framework, we have studied the optimal …rm policy, where policy
is de…ned as the choice of the contract to o¤er to the heterogenous workers.
The …rm has three possibilities as to the policy it may pursue. Either it
o¤ers only short-term contracts; or it only o¤ers long-term contracts; or it
may o¤er a short-term contract to begin with, switching to a long-term one
if it is satis…ed about the productivity of the job-workers pair. We supposed
that the …rm and worker engage in bargaining both for the short and for
the long-term wages, and that the worker’s bargaining power is di¤erent
according to the type of contract considered.
In this framework, we show that …rms could view STCs a way to screen
the workers, in order to engage for a long-term contract only workers above
a given threshold. This policy is pro…table only if the costs, that come
from re-open the vacancy each period and the probability to be unmatched,
are compensated by the surplus from the life matching. The higher is the
workers’ bargaining power, the less is the surplus that it can get by waiting
to …nd the good worker. The workers’ welfare14 is hardly at the maximum
with this policy.
Moreover, the …rms could …nd it pro…table to engage all workers exclu-
sively with short-term contracts. This policy is pro…table only if relative
bargaining power15 is positive and high. If that is the case, the costs of re-
opening each period a vacancy are compensated by the higher surplus that
comes from the temporary matching.
If this last policy could be pro…table for …rms, it is never optimal from the
total welfare16 point of view. That value achieves the maximum with a policy
of workers’ discrimination thought the temporary market only in particular
cases. Otherwise only a policy in which all the workers are engaged directly
with long-term contracts is optimal.
We show that the Social Planner could regulate the labor market making
more attention to the short-term wages and more speci…cally by introducing
a system of transfers from the …rms to the workers engaged with short-term
contracts.
14We de…ned the welfare as the sum of the workers’ utilities.
15We have de…ned relative bargaining power to be the di¤erence between the long-term
bargaining power and the short-term one, i.e. ° ¡ ´.
16We de…ned total welfare like the sum of the workers’ utilities and …rms’ expected
pro…ts in each possible policy.
17Appendix 1: Search Equilibrium on the SL policy
1.1 Proof of Proposition 1.
W es t a r tt h ep r o o fo ft h ep r o p o s i t i o nb yp r o v i n gas i m p l eL e m m ao nt h e
equilibrium search strategy of the …rm.
Lemma 11 The set X of workers the …rm accepts in SL contract is an
interval of the form (z;1].
Proof. Consider any worker x in X. Given the de…nition of equilibrium,
xy > ±EU.H e n c ef o ra n yx0 >x , x0y>± E U .
From Lemma 1, we know the set of workers accepted by the …rm is an
































































To check that this solution is unique, observe that the left-hand side
of equation (16) is increasing in z,r a i s i n gf r o m0 to 1. On the other









1¡° to ¡ k
1¡°. Hence there exists a unique solution
to this equation.
181.2 Proof of Lemma 2

























(x ¡ z)f(x)dx n [1 ¡ ±]
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xf(x)dx n (1 ¡ °)












n (1 ¡ °)2









1 n (1 ¡ °)
[1 ¡ ±]+®± [1 ¡ F(z)]
· 0
Appendix 2: Optimal Contract
2.1 Proof of Proposition 5
19E¦SL ¸ E¦L , ´ · ´¤
1,w h e r e
´
¤
1 = ®±F(x)(1 ¡ °)+( ° ¡ ±)(1 ¡ ±(1 ¡ ®))
1 R
0
xf(x)dx + ±(1 ¡ °)(1 ¡ ±(1 ¡ ®))
1 R
z
xf(x)dx ¡ kF(z)(1 ¡ ±)±]
·











(k ¡ ®)(1 ¡ F(z))
1 R
0

























2.2 : Proof Lemma 6
@´¤
1






; xf(x)dx,w h e r e´¤












¸ 0 always. ´¤




1¡(1¡®)± ¸ 0 always. ´¤
3 is given by equation (20).
Appendix 3: Welfare
To analyze the welfare properties, we look at the sum of the workers’






x<z +( 1¡ F(z))EU
a
x¸z (21)
where a = sl;s;l.
20For policies a = L;S, the utilities of all workers’ type will be the same










S = ®(wo + ±EU
L)+±(1 ¡ ®)EU
S (23)
On the contrary, in the SL policy, …rms will engage for life only workers
with type more than z. Consequently, the sum of the workers utilities in

















x<z is given by equation (23).
3.1 Proof of Proposition 7.
Policy L is maximal for problem (7) if EUL ¸ EUSL;EU.






EUL ¡ EUS ,
®(1¡®)c°
(1¡c)[1¡(1¡®)c] ¸ 0. These conditions are always true.
3.2 Proof of Proposition 8.














F(z)[1¡ (1 ¡ ®)±]
z R
0




;( 2 5 )




























1 ¡ (1 ¡ ®)±
: (27)


















¸ 0 always, ´¤













¸ 0 always, ´¤





1¡(1¡®)± ¸ 0 always, ´¤
3 is given by equation (27).
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